Douglas Browning: Course Handouts: Skepticism: Ancient and Modern

Skepticism: ancient and modern
 
Senior University Georgetown
Tuesday at 7-8 PM (plus elective 30 minute discussion), January 29-March 4, 2008
Southwestern University, Olin Hall
Lecturer: Douglas Browning
 
Description: During the Hellenistic period following the death of Aristotle in 322 BCE three major movements in philosophy became dominant, Epicureanism, Stoicism, and Skepticism. The last of these developed along two strands, one beginning with Arcesilaus, head of the Academy (315-240 BCE) and the other, independently, beginning with Pyrrho of Elis (360-270 BCE) and coming to final development 500 years later with Sextus Empiricus (c. 200 CE). A presentation of the skeptical attacks on dogmatism were summarized by Sextus in his text Outlines of Pyrrhonism. In 1562 this work by Sextus was translated into Latin and became the dominant philosophical text among philosophers, students of philosophy, and the intellectual leaders of late-Renaissance Europe. In effect its translation initiated a crisis in regard to claims to knowledge of every sort, philosophical, religious, and scientific. This crisis was attacked head-on by Rene Descartes, often referred to as the "father of modern philosophy," who began his own rebuttal by considering a development of skepticism beyond even Sextus. In the 18th century David Hume revived skepticism with a twist of his own. The arguments against certainty and dogmatism that were brought to fruition in the ancient movement of skepticism continue to haunt philosophers today.
 
Strongly Recommended Books:
        1. Popkin, Richard. The History of Scepticism: From Erasmus to Spinoza. Univ. of California Press. 1979. Rated *****. New from Amazon 24.95; used from 6.32.
        2. Sextus Empiricus: Selections from the Major Writings on Scepticism, Man, and God. Edited by P. P. Hallie, Translated by S. G. Etheridge. Hackett Publishing Co. 1985. New from Amazon 10.95; used from 4.50.
 
(There are several other translations of Sextus Empiricus, perhaps the best by Benson Mates. Almost any will do.)
 
A First-class Scholarly Book on Ancient Skepticism:
        Annas, Julia and Barnes, Jonathan. The Modes of Scepticism. Cambridge University Press 1985. Rated *****. (I don't recommend you buy this, but maybe, if you want to delve into philosophical scholarship by two of the very top scholars of Classical Greek texts, you might look at it in a library. You can get it new at Amazon for 29.99 and used from 8.69.)
 
Discussions: We will begin with discussion of pp. xiii-86 of the Popkin book. I suggest that you read the entire book at some point in your life, since it tells a story that is (at least in my view) compelling. We will then devote the last four sessions of the course taking a close look at some of the material from the Selections from Sextus Empiricus, including the Introduction by the editors.
 
        There may be handouts at some of the sessions, copies of which will also be available on the internet at http://uts.cc.utexas.edu/~browning/handouts/senun.html. My web site home page is at http://uts.cc.utexas.edu/~browning. My email address is Browning@mail.utexas.edu. My telephone number is (512) 259-0551.

  The Eudaimonistic Model of Ethics
 
Julia Annas makes these remarks:
 
Ancient ethical theories are concerned with the agent's life as a whole, and with his character.  Concern with character and choice, with practical reasoning and the role of the emotions, is central rather than marginal.  . . . Its leading notions are not those of obligation, duty, and rule-following; instead of these 'imperative' notions it uses 'attractive'notions like those of goodness and worth.  [The Morality of Happiness, Oxford University Press, 1993, p. 5.]
 
Ethical theory is designed to enable us to reflect on this implicit overall goal and to make it determinate.  For while there is consensus that our final end is happiness (eudaimonia), this is trivial, for substantial disagreement remains as to what happiness consists in.  (Because of this verbal agreement, ancient theories may conveniently be referred to as eudaimonistic.)  [Ibid. pp. 11-2]
 
Note:  The English term 'happiness' is the "traditional" translation of 'eudaimonia', but it can be misleading.  A better translation is "well being and well doing," but this is cumbersome.  It has therefore become common for scholars to use the Greek term itself.
 
The eudaimonistic model of ethics consists, therefore, of the centricity of the notions of good, the good life, and those excellences of character (virtues) which provide for the achievement of the good life.  The notion of ought in the modern sense does not arise.  The assumption is that the overriding ethical concern of a human being is the achievement of the good life.
 
It was Aristotle who set out the structure of the eudaimonistic model of ethics most carefully.  Quotations from his Nicomachean Ethics [translation by Martin Ostwald] are significant. 
 
Now, if there exists an end in the realm of action which we desire for its own sake, an end which determines all our other desires; if, in other words, we do not make all our choices for the sake of something else-for in this way the process will go on infinitely so that our desire would be futile and pointless-then obviously this end will be the good, that is, the highest good.  Will not the knowledge of this good, consequently, be very important to our lives?  Would it not better equip us, like archers who have a target to aim at, to hit the proper mark?  If so, we must try to comprehend in outline at least what this good is and to which branch of knowledge or to which capacity it belongs.  [1094a 18-26.]
 
To call happiness [eudaimonia] the highest good is perhaps a little trite, and a clearer account of what it is, is still required.  Perhaps this is best done by first ascertaining the proper function of man.  [1097b 21-24.]
 
If we take the proper function of man to be a certain kind of life, and if this kind of life is an activity of the soul and consists in actions performed in conjunction with the rational element . . . we reach the conclusion that the good of man is an activity of the soul in conformity with excellence or virtue, and if there are several virtues, in conformity with the best and most complete.  . . . But we must add "in a complete life.  [1098a 11-16.]
 
The last two quotations allow us to introduce two additional elements of the eudaimonistic model as it was understood among the ancient Greeks from the Classic through the Hellenistic periods.  These are the assumptions
      1.  that the nature of the good life for man and the nature of the virtues which are essential to it are based, at least to a limiting extent, on the nature of man, and
      2.  that the essential element of human nature upon which the good life and the virtues rest is reason (logos) or the rational soul.
 
                                                                        Douglas Browning
                                                                        The University of Texas at Austin