Douglas Browning: Handouts: History of Ethics

                                         

 

These handouts were presented in one or

another version of an undergraduate,  

senior-level course on the history of ethics

ARISTOTLE AND THE EARLY STOICS ON THE EXPLANATION OF ACTION

Like Aristotle and like Epicurus, the Stoics analysed actions done by an agent (whether human or animal), in contrast to motions undergone by them as a result of purely external forces, in terms of two basic factors. There is a desiderative state in the animal, which programmes it to pursue or avoid certain things (or, more generally, to act) in various circumstances. And there is an informational component, some sort of awareness of factors or aspects of the situation which indicate that the achievement of a goal is in the animal's power. (Inwood 4)

. . . the Stoics, like Aristotle and Epicurus, accepted the principle laid down by Plato that all action is goal-directed and purposive, and is undertaken in order to get something worth having for the agent or to avoid something it would be better not to have. (Inwood 56)

A.  The two basic causal factors

1. desiderative: desire (orexis), of three sorts

appetite (epithumia)

spiritedness (thumos)

wish (boulesis)

2. informational: discrimination (nous in a broad sense), of three sorts

appearance-as (phantasia)

sense-perception (aisthesis)

thought (dianoia or nous in a narrow sense)

    But as to the informational component, Aristotle says:

phantasia comes about either through thought or through sense-perception. (MA 702a17-20

    

     Thus, the stricter and more basic account is that the two components which combine to       cause action are

1. desire (which provides an end)

2. phantasia (which provides a means, instrumental or contributory, to the     actualization of that end)

 

 

     One way of expressing how these two factors of desire and phantasia come together to      produce human action is as an exercise of practical reason. Aristotle sets this out as a      "practical syllogism." (I am following Nussbaum's analysis of the practical syllogism as      a model for explaining action by its antecedents or causes, and not as a description of      deliberation.)

Premise 1:  a belief that I have end E

Premise 2:  a belief that an action X within my power is a [the "best"]

                  means to E

Conclusion:  I do X

     Premise 1 is true if and only if I have a desire for E. Premise 2 is true only if X appears      to me as a possible action which would serve as a means to E. The conclusion is not a      proposition, but action itself, as Aristotle tells us over and over.

B. Rational human action.

     The paradigm of rational action is that which is preceded by and follows from      deliberation. Such action results from a choice (prohairesis) of means among a number      about which the agent has deliberated. Aristotle puts his view this way:

Since, then, the object of choice is something within our power which we desire as a result of deliberation, we may define choice as a deliberate desire for things that are within our power: we arrive at a decision on the basis of deliberation and then let the deliberation guide our desire. (EN 1113a9-13)

Choice is the starting point of action: it is the source of motion but not the end for the sake of which we act . . . The starting point of choice, however, is desire and reasoning directed toward some end. That is why there cannot be choice either without intelligence and thought or without some moral characteristic [hexis]; for good and bad action in human conduct are not possible without thought and character. Now thought alone moves nothing; only thought which is directed to some end and concerned with action can do so. (EN 1139a31-36)

     Two points:

     (1) The phantasmata in such a case consists of the appearances of such and such      possible actions as means (as well as the appearance of one such possible action as the      "preferable" means) and results from rational thought as well as (possibly)      sense-perception, for these are the only two sorts of phantasia, i. e., deliberative and      perceptual phantasia (as Aristotle calls them).

     (2) The choice is itself a desire or, rather, it is the activation of a dispositional desire by      virtue of the fact that the conclusion of deliberation is, as a means to satisfying the      desire,  a guiding of the desire.

     The model, then, for a causal explanation of rational human action must be      something like this:

desire for E      

        activated desire     bodily    action

            for X-to-E               changes

  deliberative   

conclusion of

  X as means

      to E

 

 

     Given the causal sequence, the effect X will take place, necessarily, unless external      forces preclude or deflect it.

The question of moral responsibility is central to the Stoic treatment of action. They devised a psychology of action which enabled them to hold men responsible for all their actions. The question of responsibility was of importance to Plato and Aristotle tooand that is a sweeping understatement. But it was not until the generation after Aristotle's death that the problem took centre stage in Greek philosophy, and became a matter of pressing concern to both Epicurus and the Stoics. The reason in each case was the same: the challenge to a belief in moral responsibility which stimulated interest in the problem came from a form of determinism. . .

For Aristotle, and for his commentator Alexander of Aphrodisias . . . , rationality in human action manifested itself first and foremost in deliberation. Here is a major difference between the Stoics and the Aristotelian tradition. For as Alexander himself says, the Stoics did not make deliberation a part of their notion of rational action. They made assent, not deliberation, the locus of rationality and responsibility. (Inwood 44)

A.  In general (for humans and animals) there are two basic causal factors explanatory of

     action:

1. desiderative: impulse (horme)

2. informational: presentation (phantasia)

B.  But all human action involves reason (logos). It does so by including a causal step      which is intermediate between phantasia and impulse, namely, assent (sunkatathesis).      Simply:

presentation assent impulse action

     But this model is complicated by the following considerations:

1.  Assent is reactive to presentation (phantasia derived from sense-perception,      memory, or whatever). And there are three possibilities of such reaction:

yes

no

temporary suspension (entertaining)

2.  The character (hexis) of the agent determines what the reaction will be.

3.  The presentation is always "appropriate" to the particular sort of agent      involved. As a stimulus, it is already "fitted" to be relevant to the agent's      nature.

4.  An animal "yields" to that stimulus and automatically reacts, but human      beings, by virtue of reason, will "say" yes or no or will pause to consider      before "saying" yes or no. That is, only human beings are capable of      assent.

5.  For the human being, by virtue of reason, there "accompanies" each      presentation a set of "meanings" (lekta) which are "of" it or represents it      and which are either

theoretical or

practical (hormetic propositions)

     To assent to a theoretical proposition is to judge (assert) its truth.

     To assent to a hormetic proposition (e. g., 'It is fit that I do X') is to give      oneself a corresponding command (e. g., 'Do X!').

6.  To give by assent a command to oneself causes one to obey it. This      obeying of the command is impulse.

7.  The action towards which the impulse is directed follows necessarily,      unless external forces impede or divert the bodily behavior.

8.  Thus, impulse is a setting-oneself-to-do-X, but one which has causal      force. It is in virtue of its telic and yet causal character that it is      analogous to Aristotle's activated desire.

     A fuller model could therefore be outlined as follows:

presentation      triggers              causes                   causes

        +                assent impulse action

     lekton                     

                                determines

                                    

                                character

1.  Since neither Aristotle nor the Stoics leave any room for undetermined or "free" choice,      how do either of their explanations of human action allow for moral responsibility?

2.  Since neither Aristotle nor the Stoics consider the question of what I ought, morally, to      do now, how could either of their explanations of human action make sense of such a      claim as 'I did it simply because I thought I ought to do it'?

3.  What, if anything, do these explanations allow us to say about one's motives for doing      what one believes he ought to do?

4.  Why do we need a desiderative component in a causal explanation of human action?      Aristotle's invocation of desire might be said to serve three functions by virtue of the      following three purported characters of desire:

a. a telic character: it posits or intends an end,

b. a partiality character: it embodies a pro-attitude,

c. a vector character: it is a force or a propulsion in a certain direction.

     a and b together indicate that a desire is a wanting of something.  a and c together      indicate that a desire is a force the direction of which is that of being aimed towards a      specific end. But why do we need any of these?

     In particular, why do we need a vector character in a causal explanation? Is it because      the conception of efficient causality is thought to necessarily involve, as Aristotle puts it,      a movement and, thus, the "functions of movement" of "pushing and pulling?" (Cf. MA      703a19-20) Is this also the basis of the notion that "thought alone moves nothing?"

     For the Stoics there is a special problem here. If assent, which has no vector or      desiderative character, is sufficient to cause impulse, why must one make of impulse a      desiderative force in order for it to cause action? (It won't do to say that the      assent-impulse causality is psychological, whereas the impulse-action causality is      physical, for the Stoics thought all causality was physical. They were abject      materialists.)

5.  What is the conception of action which is involved in these explanations? Is it a sort of      movement? an event? But does it make sense to say that the application of the term      'action' insofar as it answers to moral obligation is to movements or events?

Aristotle. Nicomachean Ethics, trans. Martin Ostwald, Bobbs-Merrill, 1962.

Inwood, Brad. Ethics and Human Action in Early Stoicism, Oxford, 1985.

Nussbaum, Martha C. Aristotle's De Motu Animalium, Princeton, 1978.

Douglas Browning

The University of Texas at Austin