Occupation Blues
Robert Jensen
School of Journalism
University of Texas
Austin, TX 78712
work: (512) 471-1990
fax: (512) 471-7979
rjensen@uts.cc.utexas.edu
copyright Robert Jensen 2003
The Nation, January 6, 2003.
review of Israel/Palestine How to End the War of 1948, Tanya Reinhart. Seven Stories. 278 pp. Paper $11.95.
by
Robert Jensen
While Israel's
decisive victories on the battlefield and overwhelming advantage in military
force are crucial to its dominance in the Middle East, perhaps just as important
is the success of its propaganda campaign.
Never has this been
made clearer than in Tanya Reinhart's new book, which offers a well-documented
account of Israel's culpability for the failure of the Oslo process and the
current crisis. Israel/Palestine:
Drawing heavily on
reports from the Israeli press that most US readers never see, Reinhart
accomplishes the formidable task of adding insight into a subject that is
written about endlessly, and doing so without equivocation but also without
slipping into raw polemics. There is a refreshing bluntness and candor in her
work that makes the political analysis particularly compelling.
Reinhart's study
details the gap between Israel's mythology (the narrative of an embattled people
fighting a defensive war against intractable enemies who will not stop until
every last Israeli is pushed into the sea) and the actual history since 1948
(Israeli leaders' drive to keep the maximal amount of Palestinian land and water
with responsibility for the minimal number of Palestinians on that land). She
points out that it would be hard for Israel to maintain support for its policy
today, at home or abroad, if people understood the history. The mythology,
however, has long been effective at creating sympathy, especially as it has
proceeded to destroy much of Palestinian society over the past two years. It's
not necessary, of course, that all the world believe that mythology, and most
people around the world don't. It is enough that two key populations-Israelis
themselves and Americans-have swallowed the propaganda, for the key to a just
solution to the conflict lies in those two countries, where citizens have the
capacity to bring to bear on leadership the pressure that can make a difference.
Reinhart, a
linguistics professor at Tel Aviv University who in recent years has
increasingly turned to political analysis, does not flinch from difficult truths
about her country as she sketches the contemporary Israeli political landscape:
Since the occupation of the Palestinian territories in 1967, Israeli leaders
have debated the best way to control those resources. The large Palestinian
population made outright annexation of all the West Bank and Gaza Strip
impossible; that would have forced the choice between a multiethnic, secular
democracy and an explicitly colonial state. So two different approaches emerged.
One was the Labor Party's Allon plan, which envisioned annexation of up to 40
percent of the territories with some form of self-rule allowed for the
remainder. The second approach, promoted by leaders like Ariel Sharon, aimed for
more -- if possible through the "transfer" of the troublesome
Palestinian population out of the territories.
But for
others-particularly those she calls the "political generals,"
including former Prime Minister Ehud Barak and Sharon-the maximalist dream never
died, and the plans for more land, and more war, went forward. Because it was
difficult to convince Israelis of the need for war, it was crucial to convince
them that the Palestinians would never live in peace. Enter Barak and the 2000
Camp David talks. Many writers have taken apart the propaganda of Barak's
so-called "generous offer" to the Palestinians, but Reinhart adds to
our understanding with a thorough and clear account that draws extensively on
information from Israeli media, and she offers a new account of his strategy.
Barak never offered the Palestinians true control over 90 or 95 percent of the
territories, as was repeatedly reported. Because there were no maps at those
talks and the "offers" were presented as talking points and never
formalized, it's not clear just how much land was on the table, and figures
vary. Reinhart's estimate, at the low end, is that Israel would have given back
only about 60 percent, either confiscating or retaining "temporary"
authority over the rest.
Whatever the
"real" number is, the larger point is that even after giving up a big
chunk of the territories under such a plan, Israel would have retained effective
control through what Israeli sociologist and peace activist Jeff Halper calls
the "matrix of control"-the settlements, bypass roads, border
crossings, military facilities and checkpoints that constitute barriers to
Palestinian control over their land. Halper compares it to a prison, in which
the prisoners might "own" most of the place while prison authorities
retain control over no more than 5 percent-the prison walls, the bars of the
cells and a few control points. But control over no more than 5 to 10 percent
adds up to effective control.
Under this plan,
Arafat was expected to give up claims to effective sovereignty, without a clear
concession from Israel, which would have been politically impossible no matter
what the situation regarding the even more difficult issues of Jerusalem and the
right of return for refugees. Reinhart argues convincingly that Barak "was
neither aiming for reconciliation nor genuinely attempting to move closer to an
end of conflict." She points out that there was a precedent for Barak's
strategy, going back to his 1999-2000 negotiations with Syria over the Golan
Heights. In that case, Barak pursued a negotiating strategy designed to derail
real progress and frustrate Syria, allowing him to paint Syrian leader Hafez
Assad as the rejectionist and to convince Israelis-and Americans-that the
Syrians would never make peace.
Reinhart's analysis
of the second intifada is also clear and compelling. She points out that from
the moment of Sharon's provocative visit in September 2000 to Jerusalem's Temple
Mount/Haram al-Sharif, Israel's violent reaction to Palestinian protest (which
was unarmed at first) was grossly out of proportion. Despite the disparity in
force, Israel has successfully defined its military actions as a necessary
defense against terrorism, which has resonated particularly well in the United
States since 9/11. The result is increasingly common talk in Israel of "the
second half of 1948"-finishing the ethnic cleansing that has long been the
dream of the maximalists.
That process is
already in progress, Reinhart argues, through Israeli actions aimed at
destroying (1) the economic infrastructure of the territories, (2) the ability
of the Palestinian Authority to provide any security for its people and (3) the
Palestinians' political leadership. Could this "slow ethnic
cleansing," as Reinhart terms it, be transformed into a military campaign
of outright expulsion? Even in the militaristic climate created by Washington's
so-called "war on terrorism," Reinhart contends that such a campaign
could happen only "under the umbrella of an extensive regional war."
That sentence is perhaps the most chilling in the book.
Reinhart's work is
important for US readers because of its extensive use of Israeli news sources
(many translated from Hebrew), which often are more honest and certainly more
complete than US media reports. Reinhart has pointed out that this is not
because Israeli journalists are, as a group, any less subordinated to power than
commercial journalists in the United States. Instead, she suggests that Israeli
journalists are less inhibited in covering some of the brutality of the
occupation and the politics behind it simply because the situation has become
routine; what would seem outrageous to outsiders is simply normal in Israel, and
hence reported more bluntly. Another of Reinhart's distinctive contributions for
a US audience is the description and analysis of the role of the Israeli
military. Increasingly seen as "not a state with an army, but an army with
a state," Israel has militarized in ways that do not bode well for hopes of
a peaceful political settlement. Describing the military as "the driving
force behind Israel's politics," she speculates that the real goal of top
officers is this ethnic cleansing-finishing the job of 1948-no matter what the
political leadership of the country decides.
The picture
Reinhart paints of the contemporary situation is honest, realistic and extremely
harsh. Yet she remains hopeful about the possibility of real peace and
reconciliation. She points out that most of the Israelis in the isolated
settlements are willing to leave (according to polls) and that an immediate
withdrawal from at least 90 percent of the occupied territories is politically
feasible. After such a move, serious negotiations could begin over the large
West Bank settlements, the status of Jerusalem and the right of return for
refugees. After so many years of failure, not only to achieve peace but to
create a framework in which peace is imaginable, it's difficult for many to
believe in the possibility of progress, let alone a solution. Yet Reinhart does
not come off as naïve about the obstacles. Indeed, because of her unflinching
review of the problems, her hope seems not only authentic but sensible. In more
recent writing, Reinhart has suggested that the only hope for real peace is for
new Labor Party chairman Amram Mitzna to provide Israelis with a true
alternative by sticking to his initial plan of unilateral withdrawal from Gaza
and much of the West Bank. As the January 28 elections approach and Labor talks
more and more of positioning itself as the center, the short-term prospects
don't look good. Still, Reinhart's hopes aren't necessarily misplaced. As the
comparison of Israel's policy to the apartheid system in white-ruled South
Africa becomes more common, we might remember that in the 1980s it appeared that
that system could continue for some time, and many thought the eventual demise
of apartheid would be bathed in far more blood than it was. But within a decade,
apartheid was over. Perhaps we should keep that in mind when assessing
Reinhart's claim that the grimness of the current situation is not a death
sentence for a just solution.
Whether that path
is possible depends on whether the Israeli and American people put pressure on
the leadership in both countries. That has long been the case, and is only
clearer after 9/11. But before there can be the will to act, there must be the
will to know, to go beyond the propaganda. Reinhart's book -- written for a
general audience, with a coherent analysis and a compelling call to action -- is
a good starting place for people who want to know. Her example, that of a
citizen of a powerful country willing to contest the conventional wisdom and
speak out in public for justice, is a good model for acting on what we learn.
---------------
Robert Jensen, an associate professor of journalism at the University of Texas
at Austin, is the author of Writing
Dissent: Taking Radical Ideas from the Margins to the Mainstream and a
member of the Nowar Collective. He
can be reached at rjensen@uts.cc.utexas.edu.